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The lexicographic vectors of a balanced game, called here leximals, are used to deﬁne a new
solution concept, the lexicore, on the cone of balanced games. Properties of the lexicore
and its relation with the core on some classes of games are studied. It is shown that
on cones of balanced games where the core is additive, the leximals, the lexicore and the
Average Lexicographic (AL-)value are additive, too. Further, it turns out that the leximals
satisfy a consistency property with respect to a reduced game ` a la Davis and Maschler,
which implies an average consistency property of the AL-value. Explicit formulas for the
AL-value on the class of k-convex games and on the class of balanced almost convex games
are provided.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: C71.
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In cooperative game theory eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors, referred to as pre-imputations, are
basic ingredients for deﬁning diﬀerent solution concepts. In particular, (individual rational)
payoﬀ vectors associated to diﬀerent orderings of players play an important role. First, we
mention the marginal worth vectors whose average was used to deﬁne the Shapley value
(cf. Shapley, 1953) and whose convex hull was used to deﬁne the Weber set (cf. Weber,
1988). Furthermore, the marginal vectors of a convex game (cf. Shapley, 1971) are the
extreme points of the core (cf. Ichiishi, 1981). Second, for balanced games, i.e. games
whose core is non-empty, payoﬀ vectors that are lexicographic vectors (cf. Tijs, 2005) have
turned out to play a similar role. In particular, the average of the lexicographic vectors
was used to deﬁne the average lexicographic value, in short the AL-value, on the class of
balanced games.
In this paper, we also consider the convex hull of these lexicographic vectors to deﬁne
the lexicore as a new solution concept on the class of balanced games. In what follows,
we call leximals the operators corresponding to orderings of the players which assign to
each game the lexicographic (payoﬀ) vector of the core according to the given ordering.
Leximals, the lexicore and the AL-value are the study object in this paper. We prove
that on cones of balanced games where the core is additive, the leximals, the lexicore and
the AL-value are additive, too. We also show that leximals satisfy a consistency property
with respect to a reduced game ` a la Davis-Maschler (Davis and Maschler, 1965), implying
that the AL-value possesses an average consistency property. Some classes of cooperative
games with some convexity ﬂavour, like the class of k-convex games and the class of almost
convex games, are considered for answering the question whether or not the lexicore and
the core coincide as well as for computational aspects of the leximals and the AL-value on
these classes of games.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some preliminaries on
cooperative games with transferable utility and solution concepts. In Section 3, we provide
the deﬁnition of the lexicore and some suﬃcient conditions for the coincidence of the
lexicore and the core. In Section 4, we provide a condition for the additivity of leximals,
the lexicore and the AL-value. In Section 5, we provide a consistency property of leximals
and an average consistency property of the AL-value. In Section 6, we give explicit formulas
for the leximals and the AL-value of k-convex games and balanced almost convex games.
In Section 7, we give concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being
a pair (N;v), where N ½ N is a ﬁnite set of players with n = jNj ¸ 2, and v: 2N ! R is
a characteristic function on N such that v(;) = 0. For any coalition S µ N, v(S) is called
the worth of coalition S. This is what the members of coalition S can obtain by agreeing to
cooperate. We denote the class of all TU-games by G. Then the set of games with player
set N is denoted by GN. We also denote bv
i = v(N)¡v(Nnfig) as the marginal contribution
1of i to N in v, and I¤(v) = fx 2 RNjx(N) = v(N)g as the set of pre-imputations of v.
The very basic solution concept of this paper is the core given (cf. Gillies, 1953) by
C(v) = fx 2 R
Njx(N) = v(N);x(S) ¸ v(S) for all S ½ Ng;
for each v 2 GN, where we denote x(S) =
P
i2S xi. A game with a non-empty core is called
a balanced game and the set of all balanced games is denoted by GC. Then, we denote the
set of balanced games with player set N by GN
C .
Let (N;v) 2 GN
C and let Π(N) be the set of all orders on N, that is, one to one onto
mappings from f1;2;:::;ng to N. We also denote ¾ = f¾(1);¾(2);:::;¾(n)g. For each
¾ 2 Π(N), the lexicographic vector L¾(v) is inductively deﬁned by, for i 2 N,
L
¾
¾(i)(v) = maxfx¾(i)jx 2 C(v);L
¾
¾(j)(v) = x¾(j) for each j 2 N with j < ig:
We note that L¾(v), ¾ 2 Π(N), is an extreme point of the core C(v); each L¾(v) is the
lexicographic maximum of the core of v with respect to the ordering ¾. In the sequel, we
refer to each L¾(v), ¾ 2 Π(N), as the leximal of v with respect to ¾, whereas we refer to
L¾ as the leximal (operator) with respect to ¾.
The AL-value, deﬁned by Tijs (2005) as the average of the leximals, is a solution concept
on the domain GN
C , which is uniquely determined by the core. The AL-value is the function
AL : GN








for each (N;v) 2 GN
C .
On special classes of balanced games the AL-value coincides with speciﬁc solutions on
those classes (see Tijs, 2005 for details, and also Lohmann, 2006). In this paper we refer
to its relations with the Shapley value, the Center of the Imputation Set (CIS) value and
the Equal Split of Non-separable Rewards (ESNR) value.
The coincidence of the Shapley value and the AL-value on some classes of balanced
games seems not unexpected because the both values share the same principle of averaging.
The Shapley value is the average of the marginals m¾ : GN ! RN, ¾ 2 Π(N), deﬁned by
m
¾
¾(i)(v) := v(f¾(j)jj 2 N;j · ig) ¡ v(f¾(j)jj 2 N;j < ig) for each i 2 N:








The class of convex games is the most important class of balanced games on which the
Shapley value and the AL-value coincide (see Tijs, 2005). Recall that a game (N;v) 2 G
is convex if
v(S) + v(T) · v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) for all S;T ½ N:
2The CIS value is deﬁned on the class IN of games with (non-empty) imputation set
I(v) := fx 2 I¤(v)jxi ¸ v(fig) for each i 2 Ng. The CIS value, CIS : IN ! RN, of








where, for k 2 N, and i 2 N n fkg,
(f
k(v))i = v(fkg) for i 6= k; and (f




It also holds that I(v) = conv(f(fk(v))k2Ng).
The ESNR value is deﬁned on the the class IN
d of games with (non-empty) dual imputa-
tion set Id(v) := fx 2 I¤(v) j xi · bv










for each (N;v) 2 IN




k for i 6= k; and (g











j) for each i 2 N. It also
holds that Id(v) = conv(f(gk(v))k2Ng).
On the class of dual simplex games (also called 1-convex games in Driessen, 1985) the
AL-value and the ESNR value coincide (see Tijs, 2005). A game (N;v) is a dual simplex
game (cf. Branzei and Tijs, 2001; Tijs and Branzei, 2002) if its core C(v) is equal to its
(non-empty) dual imputation set Id(v).
3 The lexicore and the extreme points of the core
Instead of concentrating on the average of the leximals of a balanced cooperative game,
we consider here the convex hull of the leximals of a balanced game, i.e. its lexicore. The
lexicore, LEC, is deﬁned by
LEC(v) = conv(fL
¾(v)j¾ 2 Π(N)g);
for each (N;v) 2 GN
C . Clearly, the AL-value AL(v) is the center of gravity of LEC(v), and
LEC(v) µ C(v) for each (N;v) 2 GC. The next example shows that this inclusion relation
may be strict.
Example 3.1 (Derks and Kuipers (2002)) Consider the following game (N;v):
N = f1;2;3;4g;v(N) = 22;v(S) = 12 for jSj = 3;v(S) = 7 for jSj = 2;v(S) = 0 for jSj = 1:
3This is not a convex game. The set ext(C(v)) of extreme points of the core of v has 24
elements, where 12 extreme points are orders of (10;5;5;2), and 12 extreme points are
orders of (7;7;8;0). Since each leximal L¾(v) is equal to an order of the vector (10;5;5;2),
the lexicore LEC(v) is the convex hull of the set of all vectors obtained by all the orders
of (10;5;5;2), which is diﬀerent from C(v). This means that LEC(v) 6= C(v).
On the class of convex games the lexicore and the core coincide (see Tijs(2005)). How-
ever, the lexicore and the core of a game may coincide even if the game is not convex, as
the following example illustrates.
Example 3.2. Consider the following game (N;v):
N = f1;2;3;4g;v(N) = 10;v(1;2;3) = 1;v(1;2;4) = 2;v(1;3;4) = a;v(2;3;4) = b;
v(3;4) = 5;v(S) = 0 otherwise, where 0 · a · 5;0 · b · 5:
This is not a convex game except for the case a = b = 5. The extreme points of the core
are given by
A = (5;0;0;5);B = (5;0;5;0);C = (0;5;5;0);D = (0;5;0;5);
E = (1;0;0;9);F = (0;1;0;9);G = (0;0;1;9);H = (2;0;8;0);I = (0;2;8;0);J = (0;0;8;2):
For all 24 orders ¾, A;B;C;D correspond each to three diﬀerent orderings and each of
E;F;G;H;I;J appear twice as L¾. Each lexicore element is given by a convex combination
of the all above 10 extreme points. Thus LEC(v) = C(v).
In the sequel, we describe classes of balanced games for which the lexicore and the core
coincide. First, we give the following obvious but useful lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let (N;v) 2 GC. If each extreme point of the core C(v) is a leximal L¾(v)
for some ¾ 2 Π(N), then LEC(v) = C(v).
The above Example 3.2 satisﬁes the condition of this lemma. Convex games also satisfy
the condition in Lemma 3.1 since the leximals of (the core of) a convex game are all
marginal vectors (see Tijs, 2005), which are the extreme points of the core of a convex
game. To be more precise, for each convex game (N;v), we have L¾(v) = m¯ ¾(v) for each
¾ 2 Π(N), where ¯ ¾ = (¾(n);¾(n ¡ 1);:::;¾(2);¾(1)). Thus, we obtain by Lemma 3.1 that
LEC(v) = C(v) for each convex game (N;v).
Let (N;v) be an arbitrary balanced game. We consider the game (N; ˜ v) deﬁned by





jg; for each S µ N:
The games (N;v) and (N; ˜ v) have the same core (see the last line of page 197 in Potters
and Tijs, 1995). If (N;v) is a balanced game and (N; ˜ v) is convex then the equality
LEC(v) = C(v) holds true. There are two interesting classes of balanced games satisfying
the condition that (N; ˜ v) is convex, namely the class of k-convex games (Driessen, 1988)
and the class of clan games (Potters et al., 1989). For a proof, see Potters and Tijs (1995).
4Let k be a natural number 1 · k · n. If a game (N;v) satisﬁes the following two
conditions, it is called a k-convex game (see Driessen (1988) and p.198 in Potters and Tijs
(1995)):
(1) v(S) · v(N) ¡
P
j2NnS bv
j for S with jSj ¸ k;
(2) The game ˜ vk is convex, where ˜ vk is deﬁned by ˜ vk(S) = ˜ v(S) for jSj ¸ k and ˜ vk(S) =
v(S) for jSj < k.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for a game (N;v) be a k-convex game (cf. Driessen,
1988) is given in Theorem 6.1. Consequently, on the class of k-convex games the lexicore
and the core coincide. We notice here that n-convex games are convex games. So, we
get as a particular case the known result that for each convex game its lexicore and core
coincide.
Let C be a non-empty subset of N. A game (N;v) is a clan game (cf. Potters et
al., 1989) with clan C ½ N if v ¸ 0;bv




j for S ¶ C.
Each clan game is a balanced game, and it is proved in Potters and Tijs (1995) that
the related game (N; ˜ v) is convex. Consequently, on the class of clan games the lexicore
and the core coincide. We notice that for big boss games, which are clan games whose clan
consists of one player, a description of the leximals of such a game has been given in Tijs
(2005).
So, we proved the following:
Proposition 3.1. Let (N;v) 2 G. If there exists a natural number 1 · k · n such that
(N;v) is a k-convex game or if there exists a non-empty set C ½ N, such that the game
(N;v) is a clan game with clan C, then the equality LEC(v) = C(v) holds true.
Note that the game in Example 3.2 is neither a k-convex game nor a clan game, but the
equality LEC(v) = C(v) holds true. In Proposition 3.2 we provide a more general suﬃcient
condition for the coincidence of the lexicore and the core of a game. This suﬃcient condition
is based on the exactiﬁcation of a balanced game.
It is known that for each balanced game (N;v) there is a unique exact game (N;vE)
with the same core as the original game (see Schmeidler, 1972). The exact game (N;vE)
is deﬁned by vE(;) = 0 and for each S µ N;S 6= ;,
v
E(S) = minfx(S)jx 2 C(v)g:
Clearly, if the exact game (N;vE) is convex, then the equality LEC(v) = C(v) holds true.
So, we proved the following
Proposition 3.2. Let (N;v) 2 GC and let (N;vE) be the unique exact game corresponding
to (N;v). If the game (N;vE) is convex, then the equality LEC(v) = C(v) holds true.
Remark 3.1. Since each convex game is also exact, for k-convex games and clan games
(N;v), by the uniqueness of the game (N;vE), we have that the games (N; ˜ v) and (N;vE)
coincide. So, we obtain the result in Proposition 3.1 as a particular case of Proposition
3.2.
5Next, we prove that on the class of balanced almost convex games the lexicore and the
core coincide as well. Let (N;v) 2 GC. The game (N;v) is an almost convex game if all
its proper subgames are convex. This means that all the convexity conditions hold true
except those involving the grand coalition. In particular,
v(S) + v(T) · v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) for all S;T ½ N with S [ T 6= N:
A characterization of the extreme points of the core of a balanced almost convex game was
provided in Theorem 15 in N´ u˜ nez and Rafels (1998) based on the reduced marginal worth
vectors of the game (cf. Deﬁnition 11 in N´ u˜ nez and Rafels, 1998; see also Section 5). The
proof of the following proposition of the coincidence of the lexicore and the core of such a
game is given in Section 6 (see Theorem 6.4 (iii)).
Proposition 3.3. Let (N;v) be a balanced almost convex game. Then, LEC(v) = C(v).
In the following we investigate some properties of the lexicore on the domain of arbitrary
balanced games.
From the deﬁnition of the exactiﬁcation (N;vE) of (N;v), we conclude that C(vE) =
C(v) for each balanced game (N;v), and vE = v iﬀ (N;v) is an exact game. Clearly,
if for (N;v);(N;w), we have C(v) = C(w), then LEC(v) = LEC(w). We conclude that
LEC(v) = LEC(vE) for each balanced game (N;v). This property of the lexicore is known
as the invariance with respect to the exactiﬁcation (cf.Tijs, 2005).
4 On additivity of leximals, the lexicore and the AL-
value
Let A ½ GN
C be a cone, that is, v;w 2 A implies pv + qw 2 A, for each p;q 2 R+, where
R+ stands for the set of non-negative real numbers.
Let ¾ 2 Π(N). We say that L¾;LEC;AL are additive on A if for all v;w 2 A:
L
¾(v + w) = L
¾(v) + L
¾(w);
LEC(v + w) = LEC(v) + LEC(w);
AL(v + w) = AL(v) + AL(w):
The next example illustrates that the leximals, the lexicore and the AL-value are not
necessarily additive on the class of balanced games.
Example 4.1. Let (N;v) and (N;w) be the following games:
N = f1;2;3g; v(1;3) = v(2;3) = v(N) = 1; v(S) = 0 otherwise,
w(1;2) = w(1;2;3) = 1; w(S) = 0 otherwise.
Then,
C(v) = f(0;0;1)g; C(w) = conv(f(0;0;0);(0;1;0)g);
6and
C(v + w) = conv(f(1;0;1);(0;1;1);(1;1;0)g):




(1;2;3)(w) = (0;0;1) + (1;0;0) 6= L
(1;2;3)(v + w) = (1;1;0);
LEC(v + w) = C(v + w) ¾ LEC(v) + LEC(w) = C(v) + C(w):
Since all these solutions are selections of the core, and many subcones of GC are known
where the core is additive (see, for example, Tijs and Branzei, 2002), an interesting question
is whether or not L¾, ¾ 2 Π(N), LEC, and AL are additive on such cones. To tackle this
question we use a result of Kohlberg (1972) and Tijs (2006) saying that lexicographic
optimization on polytopes is linear programming. To be more precise, given a polytope P
in RN and an order ¾ 2 Π(N), for all ² > 0 suﬃciently small, there is a unique ˆ x 2 P such
that
a
¾;² ¢ ˆ x = maxfa
¾;² ¢ xjx 2 Pg; and ˆ x is the lexicographic maximum of P w.r.t. ¾,





Theorem 4.2. Let K be a cone of n-person balanced games on which the core correspon-
dence is additive. Then,
(i) L¾ is additive for each ¾ 2 Π(N);
(ii) AL is additive;
(iii) LEC is additive.
Proof. (i) Take v;w 2 K and ¾ 2 Π(N). We have to prove that L¾(v+w) = L¾(v)+L¾(w).
Since C(v);C(w) and C(v + w) are polytopes we can ﬁnd an ² > 0, such that
argmaxfa
¾;² ¢ xjx 2 C(u)g = L
¾(u)
for u 2 fv;w;v + wg. Further, since C(v + w) = C(v) + C(w), we have L¾(v) + L¾(w) 2
C(v + w), and for each z 2 C(v + w), there exist x 2 C(v) and y 2 C(w) such that
z = x + y. From
a
¾;² ¢ x · a
¾;² ¢ L
¾(v); a









So, L¾(v + w) = L¾(v) + L¾(w).
(ii) From (i) follows straightforwardly that AL(v + w) = AL(v) + AL(w) for all v;w 2 K.
(iii) Let v;w 2 K. Since L¾(v + w) = L¾(v) + L¾(w) for all ¾ 2 Π(N), by (ii) we obtain
LEC(v + w) = conv(fL




¾(v)j¾ 2 Π(N)g) + conv(fL
¾(w)j¾ 2 Π(N)g) = LEC(v) + LEC(w):
Now, we prove the reverse inclusion, i.e.
LEC(v + w) ¶ LEC(v) + LEC(w):
Notice that the compact and convex set LEC(v + w) is the intersection of all hyper-half
spaces H that contain LEC(v + w). It suﬃces to show that LEC(v) + LEC(w) µ H
for each such halfspace H. Take H containing LEC(v + w). Then, H is of the form
fx 2 RNjm ¢ x · ®g with m 2 RN n f0g and ® 2 R.
Let ¯ = maxfm ¢ x j x 2 LEC(v + w)g and let H0 = fx 2 RNjm ¢ x · ¯g. Then,
LEC(v+w) µ H0 µ H and there is a ¾ 2 Π(N) with L¾(v+w) 2 H0 and m¢L¾(v+w) = ¯.
Deﬁne K0 and L0 by K0 = fx 2 RNjm ¢ x · m ¢ L¾(v)g and L0 = fx 2 RNjm ¢
x · m ¢ L¾(w)g. Because L¾(v + w) = L¾(v) + L¾(w), it is not diﬃcult to check that
H0 = K0 + L0;LEC(v) µ K0;LEC(w) µ L0. Then, we have




5 Consistency of leximals and average consistency of
the AL-value
5.1 Consistency of leximals
In this section, we use notations I¤(N;v);C(N;v), L¾(N;v), AL(N;v) instead of I¤(v),
C(v), L¾(v), AL(v). We also denote N n j instead of N n fjg in this section and the next
section.
Consistency with respect to a reduced game is one of the very important properties of
solutions of a game, which requires the coincidence of the payoﬀs in the original game and
its reduced game. Peleg (1986) shows that the core satisﬁes this consistency with respect
to the reduced game ` a la Davis and Maschler. N´ u˜ nez and Rafels (1998) show that each
extreme point of the core satisﬁes the same consistency property.
Since each leximal is one of the extreme points of the core, the payoﬀs of the leximal of
the original game coincide with the payoﬀs of an extreme point of the core of the reduced
game. However, it might not be the payoﬀs of the leximal of the reduced game. More
precisely, we have to show the coincidence of the payoﬀs of the leximal with respect to
an order ¾ of the original game and the payoﬀs of the leximal with respect to an induced
order from order ¾ of the reduced game ` a la Davis and Maschler.
The reduced game ` a la Davis and Maschler, in short DM-reduced game (N n k;vx) is,
for x 2 I¤(N;v) and j 2 N, deﬁned (cf. Davis and Maschler, 1965) by
v
x(N n j) = v(N) ¡ xj;
v
x(S) = maxfv(S [ fjg) ¡ xj;v(S)g for all S ½ N n j;
v
x(;) = 0:
8Next, we will show a consistency of the leximals with respect to the reduced game.
To prove this, following Caprari et al. (2006), we deﬁne a function L¾ with respect to
¾ 2 Π(N), L¾ : K ! RN, by
L
¾
¾(i)(K) = maxfx¾(i)jx 2 K;L
¾
¾(j)(K) = x¾(j); for each j < ig
for each K 2 K, where K = fKjK ½ RN;K is convex and compactg. It holds L¾(N;v) =
L¾(C(N;v)).1
For any subset S ½ N and any order ¾ 2 Π(N), take T ½ f1;2;:::;ng such that
¾(T) = S; then, we can deﬁne a function ¾S on T, ¾S : T ! S, by ¾S(i) = ¾(i) for i 2 T.
We also denote a set of such functions by ˜ Π(S). Then ¾S is not in Π(S), but it induces a
natural order on S. Let KS = fKSj9K 2 K s.t. KS = K \ RSg. We deﬁne (L¾S)jKS by
(L
¾SjKS)¾S(i)(KS) = maxfx¾S(i) j xjS 2 KS;(L
¾SjKS)¾S(j)(KS) = x¾S(j);8j < i with j 2 ¾
¡1(S)g
for i 2 ¾¡1(S) and for any compact convex set KS 2 KS. We also denote L¾SjKS by L¾,
and ¾S by ¾ if there is no confusion. For leximals, we also use a similar notation, that is,
for any ¾ 2 Π(N), any S ½ N, and any game (S;w), we denote L¾S(S;w) = L¾S(C(S;w))
by L¾(S;w). Then we can present our Theorem.
Theorem 5.1. For any ¾ 2 Π(N), the leximal L¾ satisﬁes the DM- consistency, that is,
for any (N;v) 2 ΓC and j 2 N, the DM-reduced game (N n j;vL¾(N;v)) belongs to GC, and
L
¾
i (N;v) = L
¾
i (N n j;v
L¾(N;v)) for each i 2 N n j:
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that N = f1;2;:::;ng. Take any j 2 N,
¾ 2 Π(N), and let y = L¾(N;v). Consider the reduced game (N n j;vy) for j 2 N. Let l
be such that ¾(l) = j. We distinguish two cases.




= maxfx¾(1) 2 Rjx 2 C(N;v)g
= maxfx¾(1) 2 Rjx(N) = v(N); x(S) ¸ v(S) 8S ½ Ng
= maxfx¾(1) 2 Rjx(N) = v(N); x(S) ¸ v(S) 8S ½ N;x¾(l) = y¾(l)g;
where the last equality holds because y is an element of argmaxfx¾(1)jx(N) = v(N); x(S) ¸
v(S) 8S ½ Ng.
On the other hand,
fx 2 R
Nnjjx(N) = v(N);x(S) ¸ v(S); 8S ½ N;xj = yjg
= fx 2 R
Nnjjx(N n j) = v(N) ¡ yj;x(S) ¸ v(S) and x(S) ¸ v(S [ fjg) ¡ yj 8S µ N n jg
= fx 2 R
Nnjjx(N n j) = v
y(N n j);x(S) ¸ maxfv(S);v(S [ fjg) ¡ yjg 8S µ N n j with S 6= ;;
0 ¸ v(j) ¡ yjg
= fx 2 R
Nnjjx(N n j) = v
y(N n j);x(S) ¸ v
y(S); 8S µ N n j with S 6= ;;yj ¸ v(j)g
= fx 2 R
Nnjjx(N n j) = v
y(N n j);x(S) ¸ v
y(S); 8S µ N n jg = C(N n j;v
y):
1In Caprari et al. (2006), K is a share set, not a general compact convex set.
9So, fx 2 RNnjjx(N) = v(N);x(S) ¸ v(S); 8S ½ N;xj = yjg = C(N n j;vy): (5.1)
Then, we have








Next consider i = 2. Based on y¾(1) = L¾




= maxfx¾(2) 2 Rjx 2 C(N;v);x¾(1) = y¾(1)g
= maxfx¾(2) 2 Rjx(N) = v(N); x(S) ¸ v(S) 8S ½ N;x¾(1) = y¾(1)g
= maxfx¾(2) 2 Rjx(N) = v(N); x(S) ¸ v(S) 8S ½ N;x¾(l) = y¾(l);x¾(1) = y¾(1)g:
Further, by (5.1) we obtain,
fx 2 R
Nnjjx(N) = v(N);x(S) ¸ v(S); 8S ½ N;xj = yj;x¾(1) = y¾(1)g
= fx 2 R
Nnjjx 2 C(N n j;v
y);x¾(1) = y¾(1)g:
This implies that
y¾(2) = maxfx¾(2) 2 Rjx(N) = v(N); x(S) ¸ v(S) 8S ½ N;x¾(l) = y¾(l);x¾(1) = y¾(1)g









Based on y¾(1) = L¾
¾(1)(C(Nnj;vy)), y¾(2) = L¾
¾(2)(C(Nnj;vy)),..., y¾(i¡1) = L¾
¾(i¡1)(C(Nn
j;vy)), by (5.1) we obtain y¾(i) = L¾
¾(i)(N n j;vy) for the case ¾(i) < ¾(l).
Now, consider the case when ¾(i) > ¾(l). Based on the fact that y¾(s) = L¾
¾(s)(C(N n




= maxfx¾(i) 2 Rjx 2 C(N;v);x¾(t) = y¾(t) for ¾(t) < ¾(i)g
= maxfx¾(i) 2 Rjx(N) = v(N); x(S) ¸ v(S) 8S ½ N;x¾(t) = y¾(t) for ¾(t) < ¾(i)g
= maxfx¾(i) 2 Rjx 2 C(N n j;v








Let ¾ be a one to one and onto mapping from N to N. For any diﬀerent i;j 2 N, we
consider the two-person game (fi;jg;v) where v(i;j) ¸ v(i)+v(j). Then, we can deﬁne a
value p¾ with respect to ¾ on the class of such games by
p
¾
i (v) = v(i;j) ¡ v(j); p
¾
j(v) = v(j)
if ¾(i) < ¾(j).
We notice that this value p¾ coincides with L¾ on the class of two-person games v
as deﬁned above. An interesting open question is whether L¾, ¾ 2 Π(N), is the unique
value which coincides with p¾ on the set of two-person balanced games and satisﬁes the
DM-consistency.
105.2 Average Consistency of the AL-value
Next, we consider a special type of reduced games. Let k 2 N and let ¾k 2 Π(N) be an
order ¾ which satisﬁes ¾(1) = k. We denote the set of such orders by Πk(N). We also
denote zk = maxfxk 2 Rjx 2 C(N;v)g = L¾k
¾k(1)(N;v).
We can consider the reduced game ` a la Davis and Maschler with respect to zk, (N n
k;v¡k), given by
v
¡k(N n k) = v(N) ¡ z
k;
v
¡k(S) = maxfv(S [ fkg) ¡ z
k;v(S)g for all S ½ N n k;
v
¡k(;) = 0:
Theorem 5.1 implies that for any k 2 N,
L
¾k
i (N;v) = L
¾k
i (N n k;v
¡k) for any j 2 N n fkg:
Deﬁnition 5.1. (Average Consistency) Let (N;v) 2 GN: For any k 2 N, let zk =
maxfxk 2 Rjx 2 C(N;v)g. Then, a value Á : GN ! Rn satisﬁes the average consistency if












Theorem 5.1 easily implies the following theorem.


















































































11Corollary 5.1. Let (N;v) 2 GN: For any k 2 N, let zk = maxfxk 2 Rjx 2 C(N;v)g.











i (N n fjg;v
L¾i(N;v)











i (N;v) = L
¾i
i (N n j;v
L¾i
















i (N n j;v
L¾i
(N;v)):
6 The AL-value for some classes of games
In this section, we give explicit formulas for the leximals and the AL-value of games be-
longing to some classes of games with some convexity ﬂavour.
6.1 The AL-value of k-convex games
Let 1 · k · n and let (N;v) be a k-convex game. Driessen (1988) gives a necessary and
suﬃcient condition of k-convexity of a game.
Theorem 6.1.(Driessen (1988)) Let 1 · k · n. A game (N;v) is k-convex if and only if
it satisﬁes the following four conditions:
(i) v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) · v(T [ fig) ¡ v(T) for all i 2 N;S ½ T ½ N n i with jTj · k ¡ 2,
(ii) v(N) ¡ v(S) ¸
P
j2NnS bv
j for all S ½ N with jSj ¸ k,
(iii) v(N) ¡ v(S) ·
P
j2NnS bv
j for all S ½ N with jSj = k ¡ 1,
(iv) v(N) ¡ v(S) ¸
P
j2(NnS)ni bv
j + maxj2Sfv((S n j) [ fig) ¡ v(S n j)g for all i 2 N and
all S ½ N n i with S 6= ; and jSj = k ¡ 1.
Note that n- and (n¡1)-convex games are convex games. Driessen (1988) completely
characterizes the extreme points of the core of k-convex games.
Theorem 6.2. (Driessen(1988)) Let (N;v) be a k-convex game. Then, the set of extreme





> > > > <
> > > > :
v(f¿(j) 2 Njj · ig) ¡ v(f¿(j) 2 Njj < ig) if i < k
v(N) ¡ v(f¿(j) 2 Njj < ig) ¡
P
j>i bv
¿(j) if i = k
bv
¿(i) if i > k:
12Theorem 6.3. Let (N;v) be a k-convex game. Then for each ¾ 2 Π(N); the leximal





> > > > <
> > > > :
bv
¾(i) if i < n ¡ k + 1
v(N) ¡ v(f¾(j) 2 Njj > ig) ¡
P
j<i bv
¾(j) if i = n ¡ k + 1 (6:1)
v(f¾(j) 2 Njj ¸ ig) ¡ v(f¾(j) 2 Njj > ig) if i > n ¡ k + 1:
Moreover, the AL-value AL(v) is given by










s!(n ¡ 1 ¡ s)!
n!















Proof. For any order ¿ 2 Π(N), take any player t 2 N such that ¿(i) = t;i 2 N. Then,
player t receives one of the payoﬀs bv




where S = f¿(j) 2 Nj¿(j) < ¿(s)g for s < i;s 2 N and T = f¿(j) 2 Nj¿(j) <
¿(i)g. Therefore, we have to compare bv
t, v(S [ ftg) ¡ v(S), v(S0 [ ftg) ¡ v(S0) and
v(N) ¡ v(T) ¡
P
u2Nn(T[ftg) bv
u, where jTj = k ¡ 1;T µ N n t and S0 ½ S µ T.
Then, the condition (i) of Theorem 6.1 implies
v(S [ ftg) ¡ v(S) ¸ v(S
0 [ ftg) ¡ v(S
0)
for all S0 and S such that S0 ½ S µ N n t with jSj · k ¡ 1. The condition (ii) of Theorem
6.1 implies
0







A ¡ (v(T [ ftg) ¡ v(T))
























These inequalities imply that for any t 2 N and T µ N n ftg with jTj = k ¡ 1 and for
S0 ½ S µ T,
b
v






13¸ v(T[ftg)¡v(T) ¸ v(S[ftg)¡v(S) ¸ v(S
0[ftg)¡v(S
0): (6:2)
Then, for each order ¾ 2 Π(N), the ﬁrst n¡k players j get their marginal contribution
bv




u, where T = fk 2 Nj¾¡1(k) > tg, because after the ﬁrst
n ¡ k players j got bv
j, this is, by (6.2), the maximal payoﬀ of t in the core . After the
(n¡k+1)-th player t got his payoﬀ the restricted game vjT = v to T is a convex game.
Then, the (n¡k+2)-th player j1 gets v(T) ¡ v(T n fj1g) because of the convexity of vjT,
the (n¡k+3)-th player j2 gets v(T n fj1g) ¡ v(T n fj1;j2g), and so on. This implies that
the leximal L¾(v) is given by (6.1).



























































i1;i2;:::ik¡1 2 N n i
mutually diﬀerent

















































s!(n ¡ 1 ¡ s)!
(n ¡ 1)!
(v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S))
+




















s!(n ¡ 1 ¡ s)!
n!




















s!(n ¡ 1 ¡ s)!
n!












(k ¡ 1)!(n ¡ k)!
n!
X
T ½ N n i






(k ¡ 1)!(n ¡ k)!
n!
X
T ½ N n i
jTj = k ¡ 1
v(T):







n! (v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S)), which is similar to the Shapley value


















T½Nni;jTj=k¡1 v(T), which can be seen as an adjustment term.
Remark 6.2. The AL-value coincides with the ESNR-value on the class of 1-convex games
(see also Tijs (2005)).




































So, on the class of 2-convex games the AL-value is a convex combination of the CIS-value
and the ESNR-value.
Remark 6.4. By the proof of Theorem 6.1, we can ﬁnd that each extreme point of the
core C(v) appears as a leximal L¾(v) for some ¾ 2 Π(N), in case v is a k-convex game.
This implies LEC(v) = C(v) by Lemma 3.1.
156.2 The AL-value of balanced almost convex games
The notion of almost convex game is introduced by N´ u˜ nez and Rafels (1998). As stated in
Section 3, a game (N;v) is an almost convex game if
v(S) + v(T) · v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) for all S;T ½ N with S [ T 6= N:
For any ¾ 2 Π(N), deﬁne ¾(1) = in;¾(2) = in¡1;:::;¾(n) = i1 The extreme points of
the core of a balanced almost convex game are, by Theorem 15 of N´ u˜ nez and Rafels (1998),






































Here, the i-th marginal game (N n fig;vi) for i 2 N is given by
vi(S) = maxfv(S [ fig) ¡ b
v
i;v(S)g for all S µ N n fig;S 6= ;; and vi(;) = 0;
which is the reduced game ` a la Davis and Maschler when xi = bv
i; vin denotes the in-
th marginal game of v; vinin¡1 = (vin)in¡1, the in¡1-th marginal game of the game vin;
vinin¡1:::ik+1ik = (vinin¡1:::ik+1)ik is the ik-th marginal game of the game vinin¡1:::ik+1, and so
on.
Theorem 6.4. Let (N;v) be a balanced almost convex game. Take any ¾ 2 Π(N), and
let rm¾ be the reduced marginal vectors with respect to ¾ as deﬁned above. Then, for














(iii) LEC(v) = C(v):
Proof. (i) Take any i 2 N. For k = 1;2;::;n, let us consider an order ¿k 2 Π(N) such










This is obtained from the fact that for any k < n, any mutually diﬀerent in;in¡1;:::;ik+1;ik
and any i 2 N n fin;in¡1;:::;ik+1;ikg,
vinin¡1:::ik+1(N n fin;in¡1;:::;ik+1g) ¡ vinin¡1:::ik+1(N n fin;in¡1;:::;ik+1;ig)
16¸ vinin¡1:::ik+1ik(Nnfin;in¡1;:::;ik+1;ikg)¡vinin¡1:::ik+1ik(Nnfin;in¡1;:::;ik+1;ik;ig): (6:4)
Now, we show inequality (6.4). We put w = vinin¡1:::ik+1 and T = fin;in¡1;:::;ik+1g.
Then, we have to show that for any i 2 N n fin;in¡1;:::;ik+1;ikg,
w(N n T) ¡ w(N n (T [ fig)) ¸ wik(N n (T [ fikg)) ¡ wik(N n (T [ fik;ig)):
This is because
wik(N n (T [ fikg)) ¡ wik(N n (T [ fik;ig))
= maxfw(N n T) ¡ b
w
ik;w(N n (T [ fkg)g ¡ maxfw(N n (T [ fig)) ¡ b
w
ik;w(N n (T [ fk;ig))g
= w(N n (T [ fikg)) ¡ maxfw(N n (T [ fig)) ¡ b
w
ik;w(N n (T [ fk;ig))g
· w(N n T) ¡ w(N n (T [ fig)):
The last inequality is implied by the fact that w is also a almost convex game (See
Proposition 13 of N´ u˜ nez and Rafels (1998)). So, we proved (6.4), and, consequently (6.3).
The important fact is that, for i 2 N, rm¿1
i is the maximal payoﬀ in the core C(v).
Take any order ¾ 2 Π(N). We will compute L¾(v). The ﬁrst player i in the order ¾
gets rm¾
i = rm¾
¾(1) because of (6.3). After i got the payoﬀ rm¾
i , we consider the game
(N n fig;vi). The important facts for this game are
x 2 C(N;v) () xjNnfig 2 C(N n fig;vi);
and the game (N n fig;vi) is also balanced and almost convex. The ﬁrst fact follows from
the consistency of the core by Peleg(1986), and the second fact is from N´ u˜ nez and Rafels
(1998).
Hence, the second player j according to the order ¾ should get rm¾
j = rm¾
¾(2) by






¾(k) for all k 2 f1;2;:::;ng:









for all k 2 f1;2;:::;ng.
(iii) Since, by (i), all the extreme points of the core C(v) are leximals L¾(v) for some
¾ 2 Π(N), we obtain by Lemma 3.1 that LEC(v) = C(v):
Remark 6.5. The AL-value and the Shapley value coincide on the class of convex games
as stated in Section 2. They also coincide on the class of symmetric games, which are
games where the worth of any coalition only depends on the number of members of the
coalition, because both of the values satisfy the eﬃciency and the symmetry properties
(see Tijs (2005) and Shapley(1953)).
However, the two values do not necessarily coincide for non-convex and asymmetric
games as the following example illustrates.





3 ). The Shapley value Á(v) of (N;v) is
(
21 + a ¡ 3b
12
;
21 + b ¡ 3a
12
;
30 + a + b
12
;
34 + a + b
12
):
Notice that only if a = b = 5, AL(v) coincides with Á(v), and in this case, the game is
(convex and, consequently,) exact. Otherwise, AL(v) 6= Á(v).
Remark 6.6. It is proved by Tijs (2005) that if the exactiﬁcation vE of v is convex, then
AL(vE) = Á(vE). Since k-convex games (N;v) satisfy this condition, we have AL(v) =
AL(vE) = Á(vE) for any k-convex game (N;v).
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate several properties of the leximals, the lexicore and the AL-
value. We provide some suﬃcient conditions for the coincidence of the lexicore and the
core, a condition for the additivity of leximals, the lexicore and the AL-value, a consistency
property of leximals and an average consistency property of the AL-value. We also give
explicit formulas for the leximals and the AL-value of k-convex games and balanced almost
convex games.
Though the lexicore is a reﬁnement of the core, there is another interesting set called
Weber set W(v), which is the convex hull of the marginals and includes the core C(v). It
is known that C(v) = W(v) if and only if the game v is convex (cf. Weber, 1988, and
Ichiishi, 1981). Moreover we have LEC(v) = C(v) = W(v) if v is convex in Section 3.
As we showed in the paper, the convexity is not necessary for LEC(v) = C(v). To ﬁnd a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for LEC(v) = C(v) is an interesting topic to study.
The leximals satisfy the DM-consistency and coincide with p¾ values in two-person
games. It is left for further research to characterize the leximals based on these two
properties.
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